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RESPONSIBILITY FOR ILLNESS CAUSED BY DEFAMATION OF PLAINTIFF
The growth of the Law of Torts and its expansion to cover
new fields sometimes takes the form of giving further protection
to an interest already protected in part (as where a cause of
action for negligent interference with an interest is allowed,
whereas that interest was theretofore protected only against
intended invasion or those made reckessly),' and sometimes by
the recognition of a new interest hitherto entirely unprotected by
law.2 Indeed, it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether
1 For example, Int'l Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E.
662 (1927), where action was allowed for a negligently made false state-
ment in reasonable reliance upon which plaintiff acted to his damage. See
(1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1028.
2 Asby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 (K. B. 1703) (judicial recognition
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in a given situation the expansion takes the one form or the
other. A significant decision is Johnmsoij r. Sanzpsoi, 167 iffnn.
203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926), where the plaintiff, a girl of fifteen,
was taken by the defendants into a separate room and there
charged with unchastity, which charge, under duress, she ad-
mitted. By reason of the defendants' conduct "plaintiff suffered
great mental anguish and received a nervous shock which seri-
ously and permanently impaired her health." The court, over-
ruling a demurrer to the complaint, held that, although this did
not constitute an assault since no physical contact was threatened,
and although the harm suffered by plaintiff was not a proper
element of damage in an action for slander, nevertheless, "the
complaint does state a cause of action for damages for a wrong-
ful invasion of plaintiff's legal rights."
The courts in England and America have conceived of slander
and libel as being infringements of the plaintiff's right to reputa-
tion, and in those actions of slander where special damage is a
requisite, they demand as special damage a harm to plaintiff of
a pecuniary sort produced by the conduct of some third person,
which conduct in turn was caused by the defamatory words.
Thus any harm which plaintiff may have suffered by reason of
the effect of the slanderous words upon himself has not been
considered as special damage.2  Where, however, a cause
of action for defamation has been made out, some courts
allow the plaintiff to prove, as an additional element of damage,
that he became ill in consequence of the humiliation and shame
induced by the defamatory statements.4 Yet this is but another
illustration of the general principle that plaintiff's own emotional
disturbance and its natural consequences may be shown to
enhance the damages where a complete cause of action is already
made out.2
Except in the case of an assault, where protection against
fear of an immediate harmful or offensive contact, when inten-
tionally caused, has long been afforded, there is but little recogni-
tion of emotional disturbance as being of itself the basis of a
cause of action in tort. The reason usually assigned is that "a
state of mind such as fear or acute grief is not in itself capable
of the "right to vote" in Parliamentary elections) is a dramatic instance
of this.
3Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534 (Ex. 1860); Terwilliger v. Wands,
17 N. Y. 54 (1858). Contra: McQueen v. Fulgham, 27 Tex. 463 (1864)
[relying on Brandt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253 (N. Y. 1835), Vhich Vas
overruled by Terwilliger v. Wands].
4 Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N. E. 1123 (1891); Garrison
v. Sun Publishing Ass'n, 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430 (1912). Cont7a:
Butler v. Hoboken Printing Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 Atl. 272 (1905).
See Lombard v. Lennox, s~epra note 4; cf. CranEy v. Donovan, 92 Conn.
236, 102 Atl. 640 (1917).
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of assessment as measurable temporal damage." 1 Where, how-
ever, the mental disturbance is proximately followed by illness
there is abundant authority for allowing redress. In such case
it is not the mental disturbance alone, but the mental disturbance
coupled with the resultant illness that is the cause of action.
In England, and in many states in this country, courts recognize
a right to recover for illness produced by fear of physical hurt,
when such fear is caused by the negligent act of another.'
There is also a general recognition of a right to recover for illness
proximately resulting from mental disturbance intentionally
caused by another., In view of these decisions, it seems entirely
natural for a court to take the next step and allow redress for
illness induced by the humiliation and sense of shame which a
virtuous woman or girl would be expected to feel upon being
confronted with an unfounded charge of unchastity. In the
instant case the action was allowed on the ground that the
plaintiff had, in addition to the right not to be slandered in the
ordinary way, "a legal right to be secure in her reputation for
virtue, which right the defendants intentionally and wrongfully
injured, proximately causing both physical injury and mental
suffering." 9
6 POLLOCK, ToRTs (11th ed. 1920) 50. "Mental pain or anxiety the law
cannot value, and does not pretend to redress", per Lord Wensleydalo in
Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577 (1861). But of. Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 MicH. L. REV. 497. In a very
few states an action of tort lies for "mental anguish" caused by a negligent
failure to deliver a telegram. See 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAAL LIA-
BILITY (1906) 466, 472; (1921) 23 A. L. R. 361, note.
7 Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K. B. 669; see Bunoicx, ToRTs (4th ed. 1926)
56 et. seq.
8 Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 Q. B. 57. The recent cases on the
matters referred to in this note and the preceding one are collected in (1920)
11 A. L. R. 1119 and (1925) 40 A. L. R. 983.
9 The court naturally stressed the element of proximate causation, saying
in part: "On the whole, we see no good reason why a wrongful invasion
of a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind which reputable
physicians recognize and can trace with reasonable certainty to the act
as its true cause, should not give rise to a right of action against the
wrongdoers, although there was no visible hurt at the time of the act
complained of. . . . The complaint alleges that, confronting the plain-
tiff, the defendants made the charge against her in each others presence.
This was a violation of the statute (making a malicious charge of unchastity
a misdemeanor.) If the accusation was false and without justification,
there was an invasion of plaintiff's legal right to be secure in her reputa-
tion for virtue and if, in consequence thereof, she was injured in the manner
alleged, there may be a recovery, and an action for slander is not her
only remedy. . . . If the facts are as pleaded, defendants' intentional
and wrongful acts proximately caused both physical injury and mental
suffering. The suddenness and seriousness of the charge would certainly
shock a young girl, produce some degree of mental suffering, and would
be likely to do harm to her nervous system. An intention to produce the
effects alleged to have been produced must be imputed to defendants."
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This decision may be looked upon as an expansion of the law
of defamation, in the way of considering as special damage in an
action of slander the deleterious effect of the defamatory words
upon the plaintiff's health. 0 From another point of view, and
perhaps more reasonably, the decision may be considered as a
judicial recognition of a new interest on the part of the plaintiff.
In addition to the plaintiff's interest that her reputation with
others shall not be harmed without justification, that is, the
plaintiff's interest not to be defamed in the eye of her neighbors,
the plaintiff has also an interest that the defendant shall not,
without justification, by the intentional making of a defamatory
statement, induce such an emotional disturbance in the plaintiff
as proximately to cause physical illness. In WTilkison v. Down-
ton," which was much relied upon in the instant case, the de-
fendent, as a practical joke, falsely told the plaintiff that her
husband had been seriously injured in an accident, and the shock
to plaintiff brought on a serious illness. Here, too, the gist of the
-wrong was the intentional attack upon the plaintiff's peace of
mind. Other recent instances of the judicial willingness to
protect plaintiff's peace of mind against willful and unjustifiable
attack are found in Ja.nvier V. SweCncy,2- and the interesting
"buried treasure case" of Niekerson z. Hodges."
E. S. T.
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS IN RATE-MAKING VALUATION
The keystone of the conflict between the "cost-of-reproduction-
minus-depreciation" and the "actual prudent investment"
theories of valuation of public utilities is the question whether
fluctuations in the price of component parts represent changes
in the "value".' Early cases - approved of the reproduction
10 This was the basis of decision in M~cQueen v. Fulgham, -up;- note 0.
Il Supra note 8.
12 [1919] 2 K. B. 316 (false representations in the nature of threats).
"3 146 La. Ann. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920). As a practical johe upon the
plaintiff's intestate the defendants "planted" a pot filled with old iron and
when, as they expected, deceased dug it up, they induced the deceased to
transport it to a bank and open it in the presence of her assembled friends.
Redress was allowed for mental distress and consequent illness. On much
the same ground, the case of Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921), where the defendant's servants intentionally tortured the deceased,
a suspected criminal, thereby inducing a suicidal mania on his part, would
perhaps have been decided for plaintiff had the court not felt itself bound
by the precedents to hold that the suicide of the deceased was not a "proxi-
mate" but a "remote" consequence of the defendant's wrongful act.
'A subordinate problem is raised as to which method is better adapted
from the point of view of facility and efficiency of administration. The
actual prudent investment method has the advantage of giving a constant
measure of value, subject only to changes on additional investment, since
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cost as a check on historical cost, largely because the latter was
difficult to ascertain and did not represent honest and prudent
investment. Because of the marked differences between the two
measures of value produced by the war inflation, the Supreme
Court has shown increasing favor towards the cost-of-reproduc-
tion at current prices 3 as more indicative of the "present fair
value".4 In the recent case of McCardle v. Indianopolis Water
depreciation would be balanced by provisions from operating expenses.
(1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 123. The cost of replacement method re-
sults in uncertainty and litigation. Each change in price levels gives rise
to a legitimate demand for a revaluation based on estimates of experts
with widely varying opinions. Bauer, Reproduction Cost and Desirable
Public Utility Regulation (1926) 2 J. OF LAND & P. U. EC. 408, 416. Ex-
ceptions must be made in its logical application, as for example; in not
allowing charges for increased expense due to improvements on the land,
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913); Des Moines
Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (1915) (cost of
installation of main under paved street not allowed); in allowing value
for identical plant instead of more -efficient but less expensive one, even
permitting amortization for discarded plant, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 (1924); in not allowing
for cost of franchise, Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388,
42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922); Whitten, Fair Value for Rate Purposes (1914) 27
HARV. L. REv. 419, 427; Henderson, Railroad Valuation and the Courts
(1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 1031, 1045. However, the administrative objections
to the cost-of-reproduction-minus-depreciation as a method might be largely
avoided by using actual cost weighed by means of index numbers, if the
inclusion of price fluctuations in value is required. Brown, The Defects in
Mr. Justice Brandies' Theory of Prudent Investment as a Rate Base (1924)
12 CALIF. L. REy. 283, 298; Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in
Public Utility Valuation and Rate Making (1923) 37 HARV. L. REV. 173, 190.
2 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898) ; Minnesota Rate
Cases, supra note 1.
3 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 1 (reproduction cost at
theoretically "normal" prices approved); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S.
Comm. of Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923) (reproduction
cost at current prices approved, but holding was not conclusive since
Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred although advocating the actual
prudent investment theory); Bluefield Co. v. P. S. Comm., 262 U. S. 679,
43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923) (decision also sustainable under actual prudent
investment theory); Ohio Utilities Co. v. P. U. Comm. of Ohio, 267 U. S.
359, 45 Sup. Ct. 259 (1925) (cost of reproduction basis assumed). But ef.
Georgia Ry. v. R. R. Comm., 262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 680 (1923) (cost
of reproduction not determining element in present value).
4 "Present fair value" must be determined by consideration of various
factors including original cost of construction, market value of the securities,
and present as compared with original cost. See Smyth v. Ames, supra
note 2, at 546, 18 Sup. Ct. at 434. The fallacy of the use of market value
in determing the rate base has been frequently recognized. Bonbright,
Value of the Property as the Basis of Rate Regulation (1926) 2 JouR. oF
LAND & P. U. Ec. 276, 280; (1926) 36 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 123. Thus in




Co.3 the Court held that even the cost of replacement based on
an average of prices of several preceding years, exclusive of the
two years immediately preceding the valuation, did not give
sufficient weight to the current prices of labor and materials.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in the recent Ex:cess
income of St. Lo,.s and O'Fallon Ry., Case, has rejected this
favored test of value for railroad property in rate-making and
in the recapture of excess earnings. They have announced a
policy of valuing the structural portion of the railroads on the
actual prudent investment basis and the land at the present
market value of adjacent land.7 Parts of the railroad built prior
to 1907 are valued, because of lack of data as to historical cost,
on the basis of estimated cost of reproduction at 1914 prices,
since that approximates the probable actual cost. This decision,
when appealed, will place before the Supreme Court the problem
of whether price changes must be given weight in the determina-
tion of value.
The recognized necessity of giving "a fair return on the fair
value" is to avoid the violation of the prohibition in the Fifth
Amendment against taking private property for public use, with-
out just compensation.' Since any regulation of rates destroys
property by cutting off the value represented by the potential
rates forbidden,9 the court must decide where it will put a check
r 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (U. S. 1926).
6 Finance Docket No. 3908, 124 I. C. C. 3 (1927).
7 The majority of the Commission accepted without discussion the "pres-
ent value" of the land. Cf. M innesota Rate Cases, supra note 1 (limitd
value to market value of adjacent land for non-railroad purposes). Com-
missioner Eastman, in a concurring opinion, advocated the application of
the prudent investment theory to land. The value of land involves the
additional problem of the "unearned increment.' On one side it is urged
that not original cost but present sacrifice in holding land that could be
sold for more than cost is the test of value and that if, while other
owners receive the benefit, railroad owners do not, land needed for railroad
purposes will be kept from its most economically profitable use. Brown,
Railroad Valuation and Rate Regulation (1925) 33 J. OF PoL Ec. 504, 514;
Dorety, op. cit. supra note 1. On the other side, it is argued that once
land is devoted to railroad purposes the increment cannot be realized on,
that it is not an active inducement in investment, and that since land must
be bought at the market price, the fact that future unearned increment
will not be realized on will not lower the price. BAuER, EFrzcrrm REL.A-
TION OF PUBLIC UTMIrES (1925) 199; Bauer, Rate Base for Effective and
Non-Speculative Railroad and Utility Regulation (192G) 34 J. OF POL. EC.
479, 489.
8 The Fifth Amendment and the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
have been gradually interpreted as giving the same protection to property,
the former against federal, and the latter against state regulation beyond
a "fair return on a fair value" on private property. Henderzon, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 905.
9 Compare the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes: "On the one side, if the
franchise is taken to mean that the most profitable return that could be
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on the government's power to regulate in order to insure the
individual's immunity from confiscation of his property.
The interest of both the public and the railroad requires the
safeguarding of the financial stability of the railroads, since a
widespread failure would not only interrupt the service but would
endanger the whole credit system. Under'the "spot" cost-of-re-
production theory, a drop in price levels of more than thirty three
per cent would render the common stock valueless and would crip-
ple the credit of the companies. 10 In a period of rising prices
speculation in shares is encouraged. Thus under that plan, at a
time of peak prices the public is forced to pay high rates for trans-
portation in order to provide a "fair return" to the investors com-
mensurate with the risk taken of being detrimentally affected by
a depression. In other words the public compensates the investor
for the risk he takes. But if a depression should occur, the
public would have to forego the benefits of cheaper transporta-
tion in order to prevent a financial crisis.1
On the other hand, an objection to the original cost as the
rate base is made on the ground that it has an economically waste-
ful effect on traffic and construction.12 In a period of high
prices, the low return necessary on the investment made at low
prices would, by making transportation rates relatively low,
overstimulate traffic and consequently induce unnecessary con-
struction at high prices. When a depression occurred, the costs
of transportation based on the increased valuation at inflated
prices would discourage desirable traffic. This contention is
recognized by the proponents of the actual prudent investment
theory, but its practical seriousness is questioned." Price varia-
tions in a single industry do not parallel periods of general de-
pression and inflation. Moreover the original cost method reflects
price changes gradually as old contructions are replaced by those
built at different price levels. The lag under this method is to
got, free from competition, is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, then
the power to regulate is null. On the other hand, if the power to regulate
withdraws the protection of the Amendment altogether, then property
is nought." Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655,
669, 32 Sup. Ct. 389, 390 (1912) ; Hale, Value and Vested Rights (1927) 27
COL. L. Ray. 523.
10 Bonds and preferred stock are estimated to represent from two-thirds
to three-fourths of the securities of railroads and other public utilities.
See opinion in the O'Fallon Case, supra note 6, at 34; Bauer, op. cit. supra
note 7, 34 J. OF POL. Ec. at 484.
11 Mathews, Undepreciated Investment as a Utility Rate Base (1925)
1 T. OF LAND & P. U. Ec. 257; cf. authorities cited supra note 10. But there
is a similar danger in other industries of instability. Dorety, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 181.
12 Brown, op. cit. supra note 7, at 508.
13Bauer, op. cit. supra note 7, 34 J. OF POL. Ec. at 492.
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a certain extent balanced by the lag under the reproduction cost
theory, due to delay in revaluation.
From the point of view of the investor, the original cost
method offers the security of an unfluctuating value on which his
return is to be based, although the rate of return may vary
with general interest rates. 4 On the other hand, the cost-of-
reproduction method tends to give a return to the company that
approximates a stability of purchasing power.'5 Since, however,
the common share-holders, on whom the risk of fluctuation falls,
hold a relatively small proportion of the capital investment, they
receive under the cost of reproduction theory a widely fluctuat-
ing return not only in money, but in purchasing power., Iore-
over, the large proportion of railroad securities yielding a fied
return would seem to indicate that the investing public prefer
them. That being so, it would appear that the majority of
investors in railroad securities, at least, still cling to the con-
ception of value in terms of monetary units rather than purchas-
ing power.
The issue which will confront the Supreme Court as a result
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's holding will not be
which is the better method of valuation, but whether they think
that the actual investment as the rate base would be confisca-
tory.17 Since the administrative body, which represents the
legislature, have deemed this method better adapted to protect
both public interests and private property and since the majority
of security holders in public utilities prefer a similar fixed base
to a fluctuating one, it hardly seems proven to be confiscatory.
UNTRUE ADVERTISING
To what extent shall a merchant be made responsible for his
exaggerated and misleading advertisements? In the absence of
statutes there is open to an injured party only an action of deceit
based on the well established requirements of intentional falsifi-
cation, reliance, and resultant harm. This remedy is manifestly
insufficient and the cases in which it has been utilized under
these circumstances are few in number. There is, however, a
recent movement to hold the advertiser responsible for falsity
even in the absence of knowledge on his part or of direct harm
to any particular individual. This movement has been sponsored
' 4See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. P. S. Comm. of Mlissouri, supra note 3, at 306, 43 Sup. CL at 553.
15 See opinion of Judge Learned Hand, Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton,
267 Fed. 231, 237 (C. C. A. 2d 1920); Brown, op. cit szp~a note 1, 12
CALIF. L. REv. at 285; Ransom, Some Aspects of the 1'alitation of Private
Property for Public Use (1926) 2 J. oF LAND & P. U. Ec. 1, 11.
u6 BAuER, EFFEcTIVE REuILATION oF PuBLic UTILITIES (1925) 122.
2 Henderson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1031, 1055.
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by the leading business and advertising organizations of the
country, resulting in the passage of a model statute by many
state legislatures. The Federal Trade Commission is also enabled
to act under the authority given it by Congress in 1914 to prevent
"unfair methods of competition." 1
By 19112 advertising associations were making sustained
efforts to have legislation on this subject enacted. By 1913, after
these activities had resulted in the enactment of several statutes,3
other efforts were made to dissuade merchants from false adver-
tising, without resort to the courts.4  In this work, not only
advertising men, but business men in general have joined to out-
law false and misleading representations of fact.5
The legislation advocated was in the form of a Model Statute
1 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, (1914) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1916) § 8836-e.
2 The "Truth" motto was adopted at the seventh annual convention of
the Associated Advertising Clubs of America in Boston in August, 1911.
Cole, Review of the Ten-Year Fight Against Fraudulent Advertising,
PRINTERS' INK, Mar. 3, 1921, at 122.
3 Prior to 1913 there were only four states which had laws prohibiting
false and misleading advertising. These did not impose an absolute responsi-
bility but left a loophole by requirements either of knowledge of the falsity
or of an intent wilfully to misrepresent. N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (B., C.
& G. Supp. 1913) Penal L. § 421; Or. Laws (Lord, 1910) § 2230; Calif.
Stat. & Amend. to the Codes 1909, c. 703; Mass. Acts and Resolves 1912,
c. 489.
4 "Legal prosecution is seldom necessary and occurs in a negligible
percentage of the cases handled. Moral suasion is generally sufficient to
bring the offending advertiser around to the point of view of the com-
mittee." Cole, loe. cit. supra note 2.
5 Thus in addition to the Associated Advertising Clubs of America, the
National Federation of Retail Merchants, local Better Business Bureaus,
the Investment Bankers' Association, and the various local chambers of
commerce all contributed their active support to the movement. Cole, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 122, 126; PRINTERS INK, April 22, 1926, at 160; ibid.
Dec. 2, 1915, at 3; (1924) 119 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE,
1560.
6 "Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell
or in any wise dispose of merchandise, securities, service, or anything
offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, directly or in-
directly, to the public for sale or distribution, or with intent to increase the
consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any manner to enter into
any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or an interest
therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates, or places before the
public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated,
circulated, or placed before the public, in this State, in a newspaper or
other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill,
circular, pamphlet, or letter, or in any other way, an advertisement of any
sort regarding merchandise, securities, service, or anything so offered to
the public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or




drawn up in 1911 by Mr. Harry D. Nims at the instance of
P,'inter's Ink, a magazine published for advertisers. The statute
became known as the Printer's Ink Model Statute and soon re-
ceived the indorsement of the various organizations interested
in truthful advertising. The statute made advertisers criminally
responsible for false or misleading statements or representations
of fact in any type of advertising, excluding only oral state-
ments. It did not require knowledge or intent to deceive on the
advertiser's part, or reliance on his statement by, or damage to
anyone. It imposed absolute responsibility on anyone guilty of
the prohibited act.
In 1913, due to the efforts of the backers of the movement, 14
states 7 passed their first law against fraudulent advertising, 6
states 8 adopting the Model Statute. By 1919, 14 more states "
had enacted this statue; New York, after a long struggle adopted
it in 1921,10 and Virginia in 1924." Thus at the present time a
total of 22 states have taken the more drastic step to obliterate
the evil.12 Three other states,13 although not adopting the Model
7 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 6516; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1914) § 2M90d;
Iowa Ann. Code (Supp. 1913) § 5051a; Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 15019;
'Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10390; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 9917; N. J.
Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-24) § 52-212h; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 99S9; Ohio Ann. Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 13193-2; Pa. Digest
(Purdon, Supp. 1905-15) p. 6133, § 1; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 4257;
Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 8351; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) §
2622-1; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 1747k.
6Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington,
szpra note 7.
-Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 6942; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) § 8-1ST;
Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 2954; Iowa Code (1924) § 13069; Ran.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) c. 21, § 1112; Ky. Acts 1916, c. 97 (Kentucly
enacted another statute, Acts 1918, c. 147, with provisions similar to thoZe
of the model statute as regards "goods, wares or merchandise" only, but
requiring an "intent to deceive, mislead . . . " in reference
to "bonds, shares of stock . . . loans or investments . . . ser-
vices"); La. Const. & Stat. (Wolff, 1920) 274; Blich. Pub. Acts, 1925, No.
319, p. 483, (it adds: "or calculated to subject any person to disadvantage
or injury . . . "); Mlo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 3556; Nev. Rev. Laws
(1919) § 6672, § 1; Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Bunn, 1921) § 2164; Or.
Laws (Olson, 1920) § 2233; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 6249; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (1920) § 7:302.
1ON. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 41: 421.
- Va. Acts of Assembly 1924, c. 409.
12 Of this number fifteen adopted the model statute as their first law
prohibiting false advertising: Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.
Two other states previously had laws imposing responsibility only if the
advertiser had an intent to defraud. Iowa, s2,pra note 7 ("with intent to
to defraud"). This was repealed in 1917 and the model statute enacted.
Supra note 9. Va. Acts of Assembly 1916, c. 42 ("with fraudulent intent").
The model statute was enacted in 1924. Svpra note 11.
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Statute, have laws without limitations of knowledge and intent.
Connecticut's statute seems to be based on the Model Statute, be-
ing an abbreviated form of it, but the law of Montana is of an
entirely different type. Twelve states 14 at the present time have
Five other states had previously required "knowledge." Indiana, supra
note 7 ("knowingly"). Michigan, supra note 7 ("knowingly"). Repealed
1917 and the model statute enacted. Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. Cahill,
1922) 15049 (1). This was repealed in 1925, but the same statute was
re-enacted, the only changes being in the penalty and punishment. Supra
note 9. Okla. Stat. Laws 1915, c. 61, ("known by him to be deceptive or
misleading"). Or. Laws (Lord, 1910) § 2230, ("knowingly"). New York-
the statutory history of this state shows many changes and variations,
various statutes and amendments having been passed: N. Y. Laws 1004,
c. 323, § 1; N. Y. Laws 1908, c. 427, § 1; N. Y. Laws 1911, c. 759; N. Y.
Laws, 1912, c. 321; N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 590. All these statutes were loosely
drafted and provided many loopholes, including the "knowingly" provision.
In 1915 the model statute was enacted, but scuttled by the "knowingly"
provision. N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (B., C. & G., 1918) Penal L. § 421.
But as already indicated the model statute in unaltered form was finally
enacted. Supra note 10.
13 Conn. Pub. Acts 1923, c. 265. The former Connecticut statute con-
tained the "knowingly" provision. Supra note 7. In spite of strenuous
efforts on the part of the Chamber of Commerce and the Connecticut
Merchants Association to have the model statute passed, the present statute
is a compromise which will, however, probably be as effective.
Wis. Laws 1925, €. 264. Similar to the model statute containing neither
the "knowingly" nor "intent to defraud" provisions. This repealed a pre-
vious statute (supra note 7) which contained "for the purpose of defrauding
the public."
Montana has a very general statute which provides that "it shall be
unlawful for any person, corporation, copartnership, or association of
individuals to make any false statement regarding the quality or price
of goods, wares or merchandise in any advertisement, circular, letter,
poster, handbill, display card or other written or printed matter, by means
of which such goods, wares or merchandise are offered for sale to the
public." Mont. Rev. Codes (Choate, 1921) § 11423.
The District of Columbia passed an apparently effective statute in 1916,
but not the model statute. Code of Law, 1924, 459. As regards "goods,
wares, or merchandise", there is no requirement of knowledge or intent, but
it does require a "purpose to deceive, mislead", etc. in reference to loans and
investments.
14 The following contain the "knowingly" or "known to be untrue" pro-
vision: Ala. Pol. & Crim. Code (1923) § 4133 (otherwise same as model
statute); Ariz. Laws 1919, c. 136; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 38, § 249
(the model statute will, however, be presented to the legislature in the
near future); New Hamp. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 387, § 10; South Dakota,
supra note 7 (also adds: "or calculated to mislead"); Tenn. Code (Shannon,
1918) 6888a-13 (otherwise same as model statute); Utah, supra note 7, as
amended by Utah Laws 1923, c. 82.
The following contain "which is known or which by the exercise of
reasonable care should be known", or similar provisions: Calif. Pen. Code
(Deering, 1923) § 654a [(otherwise same as model statute). The original
statute, Calif. Stat. & Amend. to the Codes 1909, c. 703 reads "if untrue or
calculated to mislead"]; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 266, § 91 (previous
statute, Mass. Acts and Resolves 1912, c. 489 as amended by Mass. Acts
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laws penalizing untrue advertising if done "knowingly" or
"which by the use of reasonable care should be known", and tVo
other states '1 require an intent to mislead. Statutes with these
"loophole" provisions are opposed by business men in general, as
they defeat the primary purpose of the legislation-to prohibit
false statements in advertising; 26 and are only sponsored in so
far as they are stepping stones to a more effective law.
17
Very few cases under these statutes have reached the higher
courts, but the decisions of a few in which the constitutionality
of the statute was upheld are available.Y, An Ohio case decided
and Resolves 1914, c. 288 required "knowledge"); Md. Ann. Code (Bagby,
1924) art. 27, § 183, [(otherwise same as model statute). Beside the
aforementioned statute, Maryland has another statute operating concur-
rently and making a vendor responsible if he "wilfully and knowingly
makes . . . any statement . . . of fact." This has not been
repealed. Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, § 182]; Pa. Stat. (Supp.
1924) § 7675a-1 [ (otherwise same as model statute). In a previous statute,
supra note 7, knowledge was required. This was changed in 1021 for the
present statute]; West Va. Ann. Code (Barnes, 1923) c. 145, § 20 (other-
wise same as model statute).
15 N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 4290; S. C. Acts 1924, No. 092, p. 1133.
I '"Inclusion of the word knowingly, emasculates the statute. It has
always been the effort of enemies of truth in advertising to include this
word in measures presented to various state legislatures, for the reason
that it is always difficult to prove that a dishonest advertiser has kmow-
ingly made false claims." PnImTERs' INK, Apr. 21, 1927, at 141.
Another effect of the inclusion of such a provision is the resultant con-
fusion of issues, protraction of argument and opportunity for continued
litigation in the higher courts, thereby undermining the patience of the
prosecution. This is clearly shown in Commonwealth v. Reilly, 248 Mass.
1, 142 N. E. 915 (1924), where the defendant contended that the phrase
"knew or might on reasonable investigation know" was unconstitutional.
His contention was defeated, but the case shows the danger of such phrases.
See also State v. Wohlmouth, 78 W. Va. 404, 89 S. E. 7 (191G), under
a statute containing the provision "knowing or having reason to believe it is
untrue."
Mr. Harry D. Nims, who drafted the model statute, ex\pressed his opinion
on the subject as follows: "The person or concern that makes reprezenta-
tions to the public in an advertisement regarding his own wares is in a better
position than anyone else to know the quality and merits or demerits of
the goods he advertises. Furthermore, the person who receives the most
benefit from the statements made in the advertisement is presumably the
advertiser himself and this places upon him a corresponding obligation
and duty toward the public to do all in his power to see that these benefits
are honestly and fairly obtained, and that all reasonable precautions are
taken by him to avoid the purchase of his merchandise under any misap-
prehension or mistake as to its quality or character." PrNouns' I: z, Jar.
26, 1921, at 125.
1
7 After failing to secure the passage of the model statute in South
Carolina, its proponents consented to a statute in modified form. This
was done, according to an officer of the South Carolina Merchants Associa-
tion, merely to essay a beginning in what will be a continuous crusade.
PRINTERS' INK, Apr. 3, 1924, at 72.
Is State v. Krasne, 103 Neb. 11, 170 N. W. 494 (1918); State v. Rubin,
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shortly after that state passed the Model Statute very clearly
shows the purpose of the statute and its construction." It
elaborates on the distinction betveen mere business "puffing"
and actual misrepresentation of a commodity and definitely re-
pudiates the necessity of scienter. The court distinguishes the
case from those actions requiring knowledge and intent and
classifies the statute among those violated at peril.
The opposition to the Model Statute has been due largely to
ignorance, and, to a certain extent, to powerful, but dishonest
advertisers.20 Others opposing it rely on the principles governing
the common law actions of deceit and fraud. They demand
knowledge or intent to deceive as a prerequisite to the adver-
tiser's responsibility.21 They do not admit the distinction be-
1 N. J. Misc. 506 (1923); Jasnowski v. Judge, 192 Mich. 139, 158 N. W.
229 (1916); State v. Shaengold, 13 Ohio Law Reporter, 130.
19 State v. Shaengold, supra note 18.
"Defendant claims that this statute is unconstitutional because there is
no scienter in said statute.
"As a general rule, guilty knowledge or intent is an essential in crime
at the common law, and also in statutory crime, but not always. There
are many cases in statutes providing police regulations making certain
acts penal, where this element is wholly disregarded.
"The leading case in Ohio in support of this view is State v. Kelly, 54
Ohio State 166, [43 N. E. 163 (1896)] involving the construction of the
'pure food' statutes, being an act to provide against the adulteration of
food and drugs .
"The reasoning in the Kelly case is applicable in the case at bar. The
purpose of the act in question in this case is indicated by its title. It
is an act to provide against fraudulent advertising. The act was intended
for the protection of the public; it was not enacted because of any assump-
tion of turpitude on the part of the seller. In the opinion of the court
the case at bar comes squarely within the rule laid down by Judge Shauck
in the Kelly case."
20 "The defeat of the Model Statute in [Maine] was due to a misunder-
standing on the part of a number of influential publishers in Maine who
believed the Statute to be aimed at the publisher as well as at the ad-
vertiser, though PRINTERS' INK had taken pains ever since the Model Statute
was proposed to point out that the publisher was exempt under the
statute unless he published in his paper a fraudulent statement in regard
to that which he himself offered for sale." . . . [in Georgia]: "The
measure was opposed by a number of country newspaper publishers on the
ground that the enforcing of such a law would destroy a large part of the
revenue they received from advertisers of patent medicines." Cole, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 121.
As to patent medicine manufacturers, it has been pointed out that at
the annual meeting of the Proprietary Association of America held in
New York, May 13, 1915, the members of which consisted of some 200
patent medicine manufacturers, large and small, the model statute was
endorsed without a dissenting vote. Ibid.
1 21 In Maine the legislature passed the model statute in 1913. "Governor
Win. T. Haines, . . . [having vetoed the bill] . . . said that the
Model Statute was evidently intended to punish everybody who in the
earnestness and enthusiasm of his business might advertise in a way that
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tween the responsibility for damages to an injured party, and
the exercise of legislative police power. Business interests
favor placing an absolute responsibility on the advertiser, as
shown by the support given to the Model Statute.- This same
absolute responsibility is required in other classes of cases, e. g.,
those involving the construction of the "pure food" statutes. 3 In
these cases the vendor makes statements concerning his product
at his peril, the false statement alone constituting the forbidden
offence. An analogy is also suggested by the cases involving the
infringement of trade-marks and trade-names. If the com-
plainant in such cases has himself made misrepresentations to
deceive the public in the use of the trade-mark or name which
he is attempting to protect, equity will not interfere to aid him.-2
Knowledge of the strong sentiment for truthful advertising
together with such pressure as has been exerted by the leading
advertising organizations of the country,2-  induced the Federal
Trade Commission to take cognizance of this class of cases. Its
decisions have been upheld 23 by the Circuit Court of Appeals and
might be claimed to be 'misleading'. He called attention to the fact that
none of the expressions, 'kmowingly', 'wilfully', 'maliciously', or 'with intent
to defraud', was included in the act . . ." Cole, op. cit. cupra note 2, at
121.
22 Supra notes 5 and 16.
23 State v. Kelly, supra note 19; Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111
Ohio St. 775, 146 N. E. 283 (1924) ; Mleshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg.
Co., 107 Iinn. 104, 119 N. W. 42S (1909); Kelley v. John Ri. Daily Co.,
56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95
Atl. 931 (1915). The same rule is applied in Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio
St. 111, 148 N. E. 367 (1925) (employment of child under age prohibited
by statute).
Compare Mr. Justice McKenna in United States v. New South Farm
& Home Co., 241 U. S. 64, 71, 36 Sup. Ct. 505, 507 (1916) (using the mails
to defraud). The court says in part: ". . . there is deception and fraud
when the article is not of the character or kind represented and hence
does not serve the purpose. And when the pretenses or reprezcntations or
promises which execute the deception and fraud are false, they become
the scheme or artifice which the statute denounces."
24 Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Co., 4 DeG. J. & S. 137 (1860),
aff'd 11 H. L. Cas. 523 (1865) (advertised "Tanned Leather cloth", the cloth
not being tanned); Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 167 U. S. 510, 21A
Sup. Ct. 161, (1903) (no relief since complainant's product contained almost
no fig syrup); Channell Chemical Co. v. E. W. Hayden Co., 222 Fed. 1G2
(N. D. Ohio, 1915) (advertising no oil when product contained 85% oil);
Hobbs v. Francais, 19 How. Pr. 567 (N. Y. 180); (1019) 4 A. L. R. 44,
95, note.
25 On Nov. 23, 1915, the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World,
represented by a committee, was given a hearing by the Federal Trade Com-
mission and urged that body to take steps towards suppressing untrue
advertising as being a form of "unfair competition".
26 "The commissioners are not required to . . . prove that any com-
petitor has been damaged or that any purchaser has been deceived. The
commissioners are to exercise their common sense . . . and stop all
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the Supreme Court in several instances. But in the recent case
of Ostermoor & Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 16 Fed.
(2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), the Circuit Court of Appeals an-
nulled an order of the Commission directing the Ostermoor Co.
to desist from the use of a certain picture in its advertisements.
The picture in question showed a mattress, a part of which was
uncovered, the uncovered part being represented as six or seven
times the thickness of the covered part, whereas, in reality, it
was only twice as thick. The result of the advertisement was
to give the impression that the resiliency and elasticity of the
mattress were much greater than was actually true. These
advertisements were published throughout the country. Seem-
ingly, on these facts, the restraining order of the commission
might well have been upheld,27 thus giving a fuller legal sanction
to this movement to enhance the standards of business ethics.
2
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Prior consistent statements of a witness made out of court,
ordinarily of little or no value, may by the force of certain
surrounding circumstances attain unusual significance. Appar-
ently in accord with the existence or absence of these circum-
stances, the statements have been admitted or rejected in
evidence. Thus a witness' prior statement out of court that he
owned an automobile two years ago is ordinarily of no worth in
those trade practices that have a capacity or a tendency to injure com-
petitors directly or through deception of purchasers." Baker, J., in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307, 311 (C. C. A.
7th, 1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 258 Fed. 314 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483,
42 Sup. Ct. 384 (1922), aff'g order of the Federal Trade Commission and
rev'g Winsted Hosiery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 Fed. 957
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 281 Fed. 744 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Guarantee Veterinary Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 285 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
27The decision of the instant case may be justified on the ground that
the commission's evidence referred to the expansion of a mattress which
had been completed and compressed in a cover and then ripped open, while
the picture purported to show the filling before it had been compressed.
"There is no testimony that such a representation is a misrepresentation
of the unfinished article, or of the materials or of the process of utilizing
them in the manufacture of the mattress." Mack, Circuit Judge, in
Ostermoor case, at 964.
2 8 "Advertising has been defined as an investment in public confidence
.. Any advertisement which undermines the general credence given
to published statements is detrimental to advertising as a whole, and in-
jurious to the public. Out of this has come the effort to suppress fraudu-
lent announcements so that the public may have still greater confidence in
the published stories of reputable manufacturers and dealers." J. L. Wehn,
An Act Prohibiting Fraudulent Advertising (1913) 61 PITTS. LEG. J. 221.
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support of his statement in court to the same effect.1 But if it is
alleged that the witness' claim of ownership is a recent fabrica-
tion so as to get insurance on the car, the prior consistent state-
ment, made before motive to fabricate would have come into
existence, is of considerable significance.-2
It wo.uld seem proper, then, for courts to explain their decisions
on the ground that the evidence is excluded or admitted depending
upon whether or not it will serve a useful purpose. And so they
have done in a number of decisions.- But many recent cases
have shown a tendency to stress a theoretical justification. It
is popularly said that prior consistent statements are inadmis-
sible because "self-serving." 4 Even more popular is the notion
I Bush v. State, 19 Ala. App. 650, 100 So. 307 (1924) ; Cupit v. State, 279
S. W. 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926); 6 JONES, EvmDE'NCs (2d ed. 1926) §
2456. Cf. the Butcher in CARROLL, THI HUNTING OF THE SNniK (Harper's
ed. 1903) 28:
"'Tis the note of the Jubjub! Keep count I entreat,
You will find I have told it you twice.
'Tis the song of the Jubjub! The proof is complete,
If only I've stated it thrice."
2 Farris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915) ; Walsh v.W, yman
Lunch Co., 244 Mass. 407, 138 N. E. 389 (1923); Sullivan v. Minneapolis
St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922 (1924) ; 2 WI' MORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) § 1129. With respect to consistent statements the division between
admissibility and exclusion seems dependent upon whether or not there is
an inference of bias, interest, corruption or recent contrivance. Ibid. §§
1128, 1129; 6 JoNus, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2457. These inference3 need not
be specially alleged to allow the contrasting statements. State v. Spisah,
94 Wash. 566, 162 Pac. 998 (1917). If the statements are admitted after
impeachment by self-contradiction or conduct, they are used, not as corrobo-
ration, but rather for the truth of the matter asserted. See ijf a note 9.
Admission of statements made after larceny can also be said to have a
psychological justification, either as spontaneous exclamations or state-
ments made before the existence of interest. 2 WIGMOnn, op. cit. oupra
note 2, § 1142. Admission of complaint of rape seems a classification
distinct in itself and will not be discussed here.
Excluded: Edwards v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. -560, 140 S. W. 10-46
(1911) ; Sidelinger v. Bucklin, 64 Me. 371 (1875) ; Commonwealth v. Jendns,
76 Mass. 485 (1858) ; Boyd v. State, 84 Miss. 414, 36 So. 523 (1909) (despite
fact previous statements made under oath); Mason v. Vestal, 88 Calif. 396,
26 Pac. 213 (1891). Admitted: Baltimore Pass. Ry. v. Knee, 83 Ltd. 77,
34 Atl. 252 (1896). See (1926) 39 H,%v. L. REv. 258.
4 Lyles v. State, 146 Tenn. 70, 239 S. W. 446 (1922); People v. Spencer,
58 Calif. App. 197, 208 Pac. 380 (1922); Flach v. Ball, 209 Mo. App. 389,
240 S. W. 465 (1922); Medford v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. App. 237, 216 S. W.
175 (1919); Krupp v. Craig, 247 Mass. 273, 142 N. E. 69 (1924); Abner
v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 536, 276 S. W. 513 (1925) (hearsay and self-
serving); State v. Williams, 195 Iowa, 785, 192 N. W. 901 (1923) (same).
Repetition of the phrase "self-serving" in conjunction with other reasonc,
expressed or not, leads to an impression that a statement's self-Serving
qualities will be sufficient to exclude it. An examination of cares in other
fields forces one to conclude this is not so. Cf. Martin v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., 30 N. M. 400, 234 Pac. 673 (1925) (hearsay); Lidikevicz v. Kopola,
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that they are hearsay5 In the analogous case of impeachment
by prior inconsistent statements the objection of hearsay is not
raised. The statement is said to be used, not for the truth of the
matter asserted, but for the fact of the contradiction. Similar
use is apparently made of corroborative evidence. Thus if the
evidence is used to rebut an inference of recent fabrication,
it "is competent to show . . . [the] testimony was not of
recent invention" and is admitted by the court for that pur-
pose only.7 The fact of the prior consistency, rather than what
was said, is important. This can not properly be called hearsay
use."
Within the field of this non-hearsay evidence used for corro-
boration there are, however, subtle variations in the use of state-
ments. As pointed out, in the typical case A testifies on the
315 Ill. 404, 146 N. E. 461 (1925) (same). See 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 1765. The term seems at best a shorthand statement of the fact
that generally prior consistent statements are of no value, or an attempted
broad classification of all evidence of a witness' statements off the stand
which is not in the field of admissions or statements against interest.
5 People v. Allison, 249 Pac. 881, appeal dismissed in 250 Pac. 408 (Calif.
1926); Bank of McAlester v. Middlebrooks, 115 Okla. 92, 241 Pac. 765
(1925); Buddy v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. App. 403, 227 S. W. 323 (1921);
Abner v. Commonwealth, supra note 4; State v. Williams, supra note 4.
Many cases are collected in (1913) 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 883 and ANN. CAS.
1915 D, 340.
6 Sweeney v. N. Y. Motors Corp., 128 Atl. 550 (N. J. L. 1925); Parker
v. State, 196 Ind. 534, 149 N. E. 59 (1925); Martin v. Commonwealth, 210
Ky. 217, 275 S. W. 689 (1925); Dixon v. Walker, 206 App. Div. 565, 202
N. Y. Supp. 283 (3d Dept. 1923). Many cases are to be found in accord,
Am. DIGEST (Key number series) tit. Witnesses § 397. The jury can there-
fore make a finding consistent with the evidence sought to be contradicted,
despite the contradiction. Henderson v. Cook, 27 Ga. App. 512, 108 S. E.
904 (1921); cf. Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry. v. Clement, 220 S. W. 407 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920).
7 Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 487, 148 N. E. 123, 128
(1925).
8 It might be possible to argue the other way, saying that the evidence
is used to show the state of mind existing at a certain time, irrespective of
what the witness says at present. This seems the less natural solution, and
does not appear to have been advanced by the courts. If the assumption
is correct that the obvious use of the evidence is to prove the consistency,
the fact than an instruction is not given to that effect (as it sometimes
is with prior inconsistent statements-see 2 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note
2, § 1018)-should be immaterial. If, on the other hand, the evidence might
be thought of by a jury as having value outside of the fact of the corrobora-
tion, an instruction would seem proper in a court which would not allow this
use. See, however, ibid. 461. Cases limiting the evidence to corroborative
use are: Rapell Co: v. City of Manitowec, 182 Wis. 141, 195 N. W. 399
(1923); People v. Jung Hing, 212 N. Y. 393, 401, 106 N. E. 105, 108
(1914); State v. Waggoner, 39 La. Ann. 919, 3 So. 119 (1887); Yarbrough
v. State, 105 Ala. 43, 16 So. 758 (1894); see Conrad v. Griffey, 11 How.
480, 492 (U. S. 1850) ; ef. Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 439 (U. S. 1836).
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stand that he said on a prior occasion out of court that he owned
an automobile. The statement is taken as true to the extent that
the actual statement was made. But it is not taken as true in
its actual assertion of ownership. If, on the other hand, the
statement is offered to impeach the truth of a prior inconsistent
statement, it is taken as true in an assertive sense, L c., that A
actually owned the automobile, although this evidence is not used
to prove the fact and thus go outside the field of corroborative
evidence,-rather it is used to disprove the truth of the impeach-
ing inconsistent statementY Similarly if a witness is impeached
by evidence of conduct inconsistent with a statement he has made
on the stand, a consistent statement which explains the conduct
is used in an assertive sense.' A recent case has suggested the
possibility of admission of a prior consistent statement which
comes mid-way between assertive and non-assertive use. In
People v. Purtell, 243 N. Y. 273, 153 N. E. 72 (1926), the state's
witness identified a criminal out of court. On cross-examination
he admitted the prior identification but refused now to identify
him as surely the man. Another witness was allowed to testify to
a statement of the state's witness contemporaneous with the
identification tending to show that he was at the time sure it
was the man. On appeal, the evidence was excluded as hearsay.
If the prior statement is offered to show the truth of the state-
ment admitting former identification," it is offered not for its
0 Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63 (1371) ; 2 WIGA1ORE, Op. cit. -spra note
2, § 1126, n. 3.
1o Hewitt v. Carey, 1,30 Mass. 445, 23 N. E. 223 (1S90) ; Zell v. Common-
wealth, 94 Pa. 258 (1880). A witness says a horse belongs to his wife, not
to him. On impeachment his former inclusion of the horse in a chatteA
mortgage is shown. The witness says that this was done in mistahe, and
gives in evidence a statement made to the mortgagee to this effect. While
the evidence is used to corroborate him, it does not merely repeat the state-
ments as to which he was impeached,-it purports to throw new light on
it. The statement in court that the chattel mortgage was a mistahe is not
the statement as to which the witness is corroborated, for there has not
been any impeachment as to that, and there can generally be no corrobora-
tion before impeachment. See qpra note 1.
" Having determined to exclude the evidence, the court does not find it
necessary to decide the question (cf. text infra, circa notes 12 and 13)
and possibly does not give enough facts upon which definitely to base an
opinion as to it, whether the evidence should be considered corroborative, or
contradictory. (e. g., If the record should disclose that the state's wit-
ness had not been impeached, it would be doubtful that the evidence would
even have been offered as corroborative. See sz:pra note 1.) The state's
witness said in effect, "I thought it was the man when I first identified
him." Beyond this he will not go. The other witness gives evidence that
the state's witness not only thought, but was absolztcly sure, that it was
the man. This can be taken .(a) as evidence offered for its own value in-
dependent of corroboration or contradiction (see infra note 14), (b) as
contradictory evidence, (c) as corroborating the statement "I thought it
was the man," (d) as corroborating and intensifying this statement. In
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truth per se, nor for its consistency alone. It is offered to show
a consistency together with a firmer mental attitude with respect
to the identification.
If the major premise be adopted that the only objection to the
admission of hearsay is the absence of cross-examination, there
is no reason to object to the evidence on this ground. It may
still be labelled hearsay, but the word's sting is removed. But
courts have seemed unwilling to push the apparently sound pre-
mise to its logical extreme.12  The reason probably lies in the
fact that in general such a change in theory would have little
or no practical effect in the actual trial. For evidence used in this
manner will usually be ruled out by the trial court as irrelevant
or involving multiplicity of issues. And in a case of the type of
People v. Purtell, the latter defect, at least, seems to overbalance
the value which the intensifying element in the corroborative
evidence might be argued to have under the useful purpose rule.
If the intensifying element be allowed as corroboration, its chief
value may well be regarded as evidence independent of corrobora-
tion, in so far as judge or jury is unable to close one eye to its
existence as such.1 3 Apparently some courts would allow it as
independent evidence,24 and this would seem the best solution
when it is deemed relevant and not involving multiplicity of issues.
If not so allowed, the question is whether the very same result
should be sought at the expense of complication and fiction in
legal theory-a question whose answer will not be attempted here.
The important observation to be made is that whether the use
of the statement be for the truth of the matter asserted, for mere
consistency, or in the borderline between the two, its admission or
exclusion can hardly depend upon the technical objection of
hearsay.
(b) and (c) the evidence is used for the fact of its consistency or lack of
it alone. In (d), however, it is used for its truth in that it shows a firmer
mental conviction than does the statement in court, although this in turn
is supposed to prove, by a fortiori analysis, not the fact that the witne.s
did the act, but that he was telling the truth. By indirection, no doubt, its
effect is in some measure to substitute the prior statement for the present
statement. See text infra, circa note 13.
'1 See cases cited supra note 8. See, however, Hand, J., in Di Carlo v.
United States, 6 Fed. (2d) 364, 366 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Some writers
seem to find an inherent weakness in statements made out of court which
cross-examination apparently will not always cure. See 4 CHAMBERLAYNE,
EWDNCE (1913) § 2719.
If the statement is repeated by the witness himself, clearly there is no
hearsay. If it is repeated by another, but the author is in court ready
to be cross-examined, the evidence may be labelled hearsay, but it is no
more so from a practical standpoint than it would have been if uttered by
the author.
13 See supra note 8.
14 See Morgan, Hearsay and Preserved Memory (1927) 40 HAnV. L. REv.
712, 724-727 and cases there cited.
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LOSS OF SPECULATIVE VALUE CAUSED BY DISCLOSURE
OF UNKNOWN FACTS
Two courts have recently handed down conflicting decisions
on a novel and important problem. In both cases the plaintiff
owned oil lands which, due to their pro.ximity to an oil producing
region, had a high market value. The defendant entered on this
land claiming under a lease which in fact was void and drilled
an oil well which proved non-productive, thus showing that the
land was worthless for oil purposes. The plaintiff sought to re-
cover for the loss in the market value of his oil privileges. In
the Texas case of Humble Oil Co. v. Kisi,' the plaintiff recovered
$37,500; in the Wyoming case of lartel v. Hall Oil Co.,2 the plain-
tiff recovered nominal damages only 2
The Texas court assumed without discussion that the plaintiff's
damages were equal to the loss in the market value of his oil
privileges.- In a decision handed down about a year and a half
'276 S. W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925). The plaintiff owned all the
surface and an undivided three-fourths interest in the oil and mineral
privileges. The trial court awarded the plaintiff nominal damages. The
Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case holding that the
plaintiff could recover the loss in market value of his oil privileges, but
that proof of such value was insufficient. 2G1 S. W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924). The Commission of Appeals approved this view except that the
evidence as to market value was ruled sufficient and judgment was entered
for the plaintiff for three-fourths of the total market value of the oil pri-
vileges as found by the lower court.
For an excellent criticism of this case see Green, What Protcetfin h2as
a Landowner Against a Trespass Which Merely DlmlosCs the Spcczdativc
Value of His Property? (1926) 4 Tax. L. Rav. 215. This comment was
cited and its general reasoning adopted in Martel v. Hall Oil Co., infra
note 2. For the contrary view see (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 41G.
The Texas Commission of Appeals on the second rehearing reverzed thcir
judgment and remanded the case holding that it was error to presume
that an undivided three-fourths interest was worth exactly three-fourths of
the total value of the interest. But the court did not waver from its view
that the plaintiff should recover substantial damages. Humble Oil Co. v.
Kishi, 291 S. W. 53S (Tex. Conmm. App. 1927). See (1927) 5 Toc. L. REV.
377.
2 253 Pac. 862 (Wyo. 1927). The plaintiffs owned all the oil privilegeZ.
The owner of the surface had previously recovered substantial exemplary
damages for the same trespass. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92,
237 Pac. 255 (1925).
3 The court directed each party to pay his costs.
4The usual rule of damages applicable to a trespass which causes per-
manent injury to realty is the difference in the market value before and
after the entry. Stoudenmire v. De Bardelaben, 85 Ala. 85, 4 So. 723
(1888); Ritchie v. State Board of Agriculture, 219 Mo. App. 90, 266 S. W.
492 (1924). In the cases under consideration, both courts appear to have
regarded the plaintiff's claim as one for consequential damages resulting
from a trespass. Although the distinction may be unimportant in code
states, except as conducive to clear thinking, it seems more desirable to
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later, the Wyoming court refused to adopt this view on the
ground that the damages claimed by the plaintiff were specu-
lative. In support of the Texas view it could be argued that
"value" as used as a basis of damages should, as a matter of
practical convenience, be "market value"; r and further that, in
the great majority of cases, the loss in market value represents
the money equivalent of the loss which the plaintiff actually has
suffered.6 But the opposing view would make a closer examina-
tion into the concept of "market value." It has generally been
defined by economists as the resultant opinion of prospective
purchasers as to the relative worth of the res in question., The
factors influencing the opinion of the purchasing group are diffi-
cult of interpretation but seem to be based to a large extent on
group opinion as to the expected future usefulness or productiv-
ity of the particular res.8 Usually data as to its relative useful-
ness is available. But in certain instances such data is not at
hand and the market value arrived at must necessarily be sub-
ject to considerable fluctuation when later investigation proves
that expectations as to future usefulness will not materialize.
When such is the case it may be said that the market value is
speculative in nature and it may be questioned whether a plain-
tiff's damages should be based on such value.
The plaintiff in effect is asserting a right to be free from
disclosure, without his permission, of economic data on which
the purchasing group could accurately estimate the productive
value of the plaintiff's holdings. The importance of such a right
can hardly be over-estimated. In Humble Oil Co. v. Kishi, such
a right was created and, on the basis of this case, there seems
to be no logical reason why the plaintiff should not recover in
all cases where the defendant by making the truth known has
reduced or destroyed the market value of a property interest
of the plaintiff's, provided the defendant's conduct involves a
trespass or other tortious conduct.10
It is difficult to determine with certainty the advisibility of
consider this an action on the case for injuring the saleability of the plain-
tiff's oil privileges.
5 Of. language of Holmes, J. in National Bank of Commerce v. Now Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 313, 315, 29 N. E. 532, 533 (1892): "Generally speaking,
the effect of the value of the property of a corporation upon the value
of its stock will be estimated more accurately by the trained judgment
of the market than it can be by the court."
6 See (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 416, approving the Texas decision on this
basis.
7 See ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS (4th ed. 1924) 147.
8 See COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPiTALISM (1924) 25; FAIR-
CHILD, FURNISS, AND BUCK, ELEMENTARY ECONOMIICS (1924) 350.
- Supra note 1.
10 See Green, loc. cit. supra, note 1, suggesting various factual situations
where the plaintiff might recover.
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recognizing this interest. The Texas view considers the im-
mediate damage occasioned to the plaintiff. The Wyoming view
favors the discharge of a defendant whose trespass has inad-
vertently caused disclosures which proved so injurious to the
plaintiff. It seems that the latter view would better meet the
needs of the general social group. It finds support in the vari-
ous legislative enactments restricting speculative values such
as the federal 1  and the state statutes ' 2 regulating trading in
grain futures and in the various Blue Sky Laws.13  In fact it
might be stated that the purpose of the Blue Sky Laws (beyond
the primary purpose of preventing fraud) is to legalize the as-
certainment and publication of data similar to that which the
defendant has disclosed by his trespass."
The Wyoming court suggested that this action is based on dis-
paragement of property.15 Should it be so classified the plaintiff
must be denied recovery as he is obviously unable to prove the
falsity of the defendant's disclosure."0 And the fact that the
truth is disclosed through means of a trespass does not seem
11 42 Stat. 998, (1922) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 8747 4/5, U. S.
Code (1926) 87.
12 For the Illinois Statute see IIl. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. '8, § 328.
13 These laws h'ave been enacted in every state except Delaware and
Nevada. They are collected in CowAN, MAmmu OF SECUMTIES LAws OF
UNrrED STATES (1923). The Texas Blue Sky Law as amended applies to a
Massachusetts trust. General Laws of Tex. (1923), First, Second, and
Third Called Sessions, 114.
14 "The purpose of the Blue Sky Law appears to be two-fold: Firzt, to
prevent stockbrokers and promoters from perpetrating frauds and impasi-
tions on unsuspecting investors in hazardous undertaking; second, to pro-
tect credulous and incompetent persons from their own inclinations to
speculate in hazardous undertakings . . . Hornaday v. State, 203 Pac.
228, 231 (Okla. Crim. App. 1922).
The Texas court in four recent decisions has practically ruled the
Maassachusetts trust out of existence by imposing a strict liability on the
certificate holders. Thompson v. Schmidt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554
(1925); Victor Refining Co. v. City National Bank of Commerce, 115 Tex.
71, 274 S. W. 561 (1925); Hollister v. McCamey, 115 Tex. 49, 274 S. W.
562 (1925); Howe v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Co., 115 Tex. 153, 274 S. W.
563 (1925). This view has been strenuously criticized. Hildebrand, Macca-
chysetts Trust,-a Sequel (1925) 4 TEX. L. REV. 57; (1925) t9 H=. L.
REv. 276. These surprising decisions may be explained by the feeling of
the Texas court that prospective investors in a Massachusetts trust re-
quire greater protection than can be afforded by the Blue Sky Law. It is
submitted that this view is incongruous with the decision in Humble Oil Co.
v. Kishi, supra note 1.
's Supra note 2 at 866. See Green, op. cit. sz'pra note 1, at 218.
16 Contrary to the rule in an action for libel or slander, in an action
for disparagement of property, the plaintiff must bear the burden of prov-
ing the falsity of the defendant's disclosure. Fant v. Sullivan, 152 S. W.
515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Schoen v. Maryland Casualty Co. 1417 Ga. 151,




a sufficient reason for denying it the effect ordinarily given. If,
in actions for slander or libel, or for disparagement of property,
it is considered sound policy to have the truth known irrespective
of the defendant's motive in making his disclosure, a fortiori it
would seem that this policy should protect the defendant whose
disclosures here were without wrongful motive.
It might be said that the denial of the plaintiff's claim would
act as an inducement to his competitors to enter his land for
the purpose of ascertaining and disclosing facts which would
prove injurious to him. It is improbable that this result would
follow but should such a case arise, the plaintiff is amply pro-
tected by the rule of damages which permits the recovery of
exemplary damages for a malicious trespass.17
It is probable that the large damages apparently suffered by
the plaintiff tended to obscure the issue before the Texas court.
But it is clear that the plaintiff has in fact suffered loss only
in" the event that he would have sold or leased his oil privileges."
If he had intended to develop the property himself, the defen-
dant's conduct has actually been beneficial to him by proving
that drilling operations would be profitless. It is also to be noted
that if the defendant's disclosure had not been made, a loss in-
evitably would have been suffered either by the plaintiff or by one
of his assignees. The defendant might say that the plaintiff
should not complain because the shifting of this loss was pre-
vented. 9 As a further argument the defendant could claim that
his conduct has been socially beneficial in that he has in one
small instance stabilized land prices.
The two cases discussed here appear to be without precedent
and the courts therefore were at liberty to decide the problem
solely on the basis of social needs. As is often the case the needs
of the social group are here difficult of evaluation, but it is sub-
mitted that society will best be served by refusing to recognize
the plaintiff's interest. We need not quarrel with the Texas court
because of their creation of a new right as such. But it is re-
gretted that a more complete analysis was not made of the con-
flicting interests of the individual and of society.
17 Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, supra note 2; Hutchinson v. Courtney, 86 Fla.
556, 98 So. 582 (1923); 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 730.
18 Perhaps this influenced the Court of Civil Appeals to rule that the
plaintiff's evidence as to market value was insufficient without proving a
willingness and an opportunity to sell or lease. However, the Commission
of Appeals ruled that it was unnecessary to prove the prevention of a
specific contract to tell or lease.
19 Query: If, in the future, an accurate method of testing the presence
of oil without drilling is developed, one that would be used as a matter of
course by prospective purchasers, thus making it practically impossible for
the plaintiff to shift the loss, would not the Texas court reverse its position?
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEE COMPENSATION FOR COURTS
The system of compensation for minor courts, in some states,
whereby the remuneration of the judge is directly dependent
on the outcome of cases before him, appears seldom to have been
attacked on constitutional grounds., In the recent case of Tzurcy
v. Ohio, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (U. S. 1927), however, it was held that a
judge was disqualified for interest where he would receive his
fees only if the defendant were convicted. The defendant was
arrested on a warrant issued by a village mayor, and was charged
with the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor in violation of
a state statute. The mayor tried the case and, upon finding the
defendant guilty, ordered him to remain in prison for failure to
pay the fine, and the costs of the trial. Under the statute the
remuneration of the mayor for hearing the case was collectible
only from the costs of the proceeding and no costs were to be paid
unless the defendant was convicted. All fines assessed by the
court were to be deposited in the town treasury. The defendant
appealed to the court of Common Pleas which held that the mayor
was disqualified for interest. The intermediate appellate court
reversed this judgment, and was sustained by the State Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
decision of the State Supreme Court on the ground that under
the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
mayor was disqualified from acting, because of his personal
interest and that of the village in finding the defendant guilty.
There are a few states where the compensation of judges of
minor courts, in criminal prosecutions is wholly dependent on
conviction of the accused.2 In some of these states, however,
statutes empower the justices to charge costs to the prosecuting
'But see Herbert v. Baltimore County, 97 Id. 639, 55 Atl. 370 (1903).
The salary of justices of the peace for trying criminal cases had bmn
reduced to $10 per month and the plaintiff, a justice of the peace, protezted
that a law would make the justice apt to convict to increase his income.
The plaintiff, who was suing for what he considered a fair salary, corn-
pained that such a system deprived accused perzons of their liberty without
due process of law. The court denied the validity of this argument and
held the law constitutional. As Chief Justice Taft pointed out, a court
would not be pleased to hear such a contention from a justice of the peace.
This case appears to be the only one where the question presented by
the principle case, was before a court.
Cf. Bennett v. State, 4 Tex. App. 72 (1S78). The court held that there
was no disqualification for interest, but the due process clause was not
discussed.
2 Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1915) § 1760. N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 1283.
In the supplemental brief for the plaintiff in error it is stated on the
authority of the respective state attorney generals, or other state officers,
that in the following states no fees are paid unless conviction is had:
Arkansas, but cf. Ark. Gen. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) §§ 3273, 3213;
Nebraska, but cf Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 10274; Ohio (brief report,
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witness where the prosecution is unreasonable or malicious.3
It is at least doubtful whether this latter provision will guard
the system from the effect of the decision in Tumey v. Ohio.
Probably the great majority of prosecutions for minor offenses
are instigated by public officers, and the close relationship
usually existing between justices and officers would ordinarily
protect the latter from being assessed with costs, even if a public
officer could be made responsible. In addition, it can hardly be
assumed that every prosecution where the defendant is, or should
be acquitted, is malicious or unreasonable.
In a minority of states the justice of the peace system is
totally or partially on a salary basis. Some jurisdictions pay
their justices salaries in lieu of all fees.4 By constitutional
provisions in Louisiana and South Carolina,' the justice receives
a salary instead of fees in criminal cases. A number of statutes
provide that the compensation shall be by salary or fees, the
form of payment being regulated by the population of the
justice's precinct.6 Where the compensation of the justice is by
salary it would appear that there is no objection unless the
salary is limited to the funds derived from fines.7 As to those
justices who receive fees for their services in the states where
the size of the precinct determines the form of compensation,
that Attorney-General construes Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1921) §
3019, to mean that no fee is paid if defendant is not convicted].
Although the Texas statutes do not lead one to suppose that the payment
is entirely based on presence of conviction, it evidently is so determined. Cf.
Bennett v. State, supra note 1; and see the supplemental brief for the
plaintiff in error, p. 27.
In Virginia the fees are reduced by one half where the defendant is
acquitted. Va. Gen. Laws (1923) § 3504 (later amended, but not in any
material respect).
3 Ark. Gen. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 3273; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) §
9956 (justice may, in his discretion, render judgment for costs against the
party complaining); N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 1271.
4 Calif. Code Civ. Proc. (1915) §§ (102(b), 103 Dist. Col. Code (1924),
Municipal Court Act, 519. Nevada-According to supplemental brief of
plaintiff in error, the Atttorney-General reports that minor courts are on
salary basis. Arizona-same.
5 La. Const. & Stat. (Wolff, 1920) Const., Art. 128, p. 2275; S. C. Const.
(1895) Art. V. § 20.
6 Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) §§ 7936, 7937; Ga. Code (1926) § 6012; Ind.
Ann. Stat. (Watson, 1926) §§ 2019-2022; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 218,
§ 75 (salaries for district judges) ; c. 219, § 17 (salaries for trial judges in
certain cities); Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 2956; Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) §
4929; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 323, § 32 (all municipal justices received
salaries). N. Y. Laws (1925) c. 76 Pa. Stat.; (1920) Const., Art. V,
§ 12; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) §§ 7567, 7571, 7572, 7575;
Vyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 6456.
7 But cf. In re Guerrero, 69 Calif. 88 (1886), where the court held that
the fact that the judge's salary was payable from a fund consisting partly
of fines imposed by the judge was not sufficient to act as a disqualification.
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no particular discussion seems necessary. Any remark con-
cerning justices in states providing for fee payment only is
equally applicable to them.
The majority of states seem to provide only fee compensation
for their minor courts.- Mlost have statutes, however, charging
the county or state for costs if the accused is acquitted.? Prima
facie, such a system appears innocuous enough. But that it is
entirely free from fault is dubious. Provisions are often found
8 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, lizis-
sippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, [but see N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cur. Supp.
1924) c. 53-106], New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oila-
homa, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.
1 Ala. Code (1923) § 3850; Ark. Gen. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 30273
(but see supra note 2); Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 6593; Conn. Cen. Stat.
(1918) § 6681; Fla. Const. Art. XVI, § 9; Ga. Pen. Code (1926) § 1115;
Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 53, § 59; Iowa Code, (1924) § 10623; Kan.
Rev. Stat. (1923) § 28-150; Me. Rev. Stat. (1916) c. 134, § 23; Md. Ann.
Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 24, § 7; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 262, § 51.
("Fees and expenses of officers . . . in a criminal case tried in a
district court or before a trial justice" shall be paid "by the town where
the crime was committed.") Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 15901; Miss.
Laws of 1922, c. 165, § 1, par. x; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 7S9; Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1922) § 10274 (but see su'pra note 2) ; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp.
1924) c. 53-106, 53-107; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Birdseye C. & G. 2d cd. 1915)
County Law, § 240, Town Law, §171; Okla. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 1921)
§ 6435; Or. Laws (Olson, 1920) § 3681; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1918)
§§ 7615, 7619; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 2528; W. Va. Code (Barnez,
1923) c. 50, § 229; Wis. Stat. (1921) c. 1S8, § 4033; Wyo. Comp. Stat.
(1920) § 6438 (this section is a little uncertain and may not apply to
justice's fees).
In a number of states it is difficult to tell from the statutes what the
situation is. These states are:
Delaware. The supplemental brief for plaintiff in error reports that the
Attorney-General states that fees are paid by state.
Idaho. Same.
Indiana. Secretary of Legislative Bureau is said, in the brief, to report
justices receive fees regardless of the outcome of eases.
Minnesota. Mii. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 9136, would seem to indicate that
the county pays costs, in any event.
Montana. Plaintiff in error's supplemental brief reports from Assistant
Attorney-General that fees are paid irrespective of conviction.
New Mexico. Same (Attorney-General's report).
North Dakota. In Barrett v. Stutsman County, 4 N. D. 175, 59 N. W.
964 (1894), the court interpreting a state statute [N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 9182] held that the justice is entitled to be paid his fees by the
county where the defendant is acquitted.
Pennsylvania.







limiting the amount of withdrawals from the public treasury."
The result of such legislation is apt to be undesi able. If the
judge acts in good faith and acquits at all frequently, the limit
beyond which he is not privileged to withdraw may soon be
reached, and he will then be entirely dependent for his fees, for
a period at least, upon convictions.
Another objection to the system is that many statutes require a
somewhat complicated procedure before payment is made from
the treasury." This, too, may have a tendency to discourage the
acquittal of defendants. It is improbable, from Chief Justice
Taft's language, that the Supreme Court would hold justices dis-
qualified from acting in these jurisdictions. Such a decision would
upset a long practice and would disrupt the whole justice of the
peace system in this country.2
The Tumey case involved only the fee system as applied to
criminal cases, but the functioning of the fee system of payment
in civil cases has not been entirely free from attack, although
no court appears ever to have passed on its constitutionality."
Payment of costs is made by the losing party in civil suits."
The author of a recent article I' points out that a judge, whose
compensation comes from the parties litigating before him, is
not likely to be entirely immune to considerations of the respec-
tive financial status of the parties. It has been charged that
associations are often made between installment houses, or other
parties frequently engaged in litigation, and justices of the
peace, 0 which result unfavorably, to say the least, to those not
10 See Ala. Code (1923) § 3850 (limit of $50 per month); Colo. Comp.
Laws (1921) § 7890 ($60 per month-); Miss. Laws of 1922, c. 165, § 1,
par. x ($60 per year); Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 4926 ($500 per year);
Okla. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 1921) § 6435 ($100 or $150 a quarter, depending
on size of county) ; Or. Laws (1925) c. 283, § 2 ($200 per month).
11 See, for instance, Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) § 6168; Ga. Pen. Code
(1926) § 1115; Ill. Rev. Sat. (Smith, 1921) c. 53, § 59; Iowa Code (1924)
§ 10638; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 28-150; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 9136;
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 10274; Okla. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 1921) § 6435;
Va. Gen. Laws (1923) § 4963; W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1923) c. 50 § 229.
12 But such a complete upheaval of the system has been suggested as
desirable. "If our states are to realize the ideal of the Magna Charta, that
'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice',
there must be state-wide abolition of the office of justice of the peace."
Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States (1927) 15,
CALiF. L. REV. 118, 141.
13 Cf. Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga. App. 791, 60 S. E. 464 (1907) (the
court said that to disqualify under statute there must be an interest in
the "cause of action" as distinguished from the "costs of the action").
'4 This practice is so well recognized that citations seem unnecessary.
For an example of a typical statute see Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921)
§§ 1833, 1834.
15 Smith, op. cit. supra note 12, passim.
1 Ibid. 121; Ill. Const. Convention Bull. (1920) 763. Great dissatis-
faction with the justice of the peace system is here expressed.
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parties to the agreement. In this connection it is well to recog-
nize that though there may be many honest and public spirited
justices, yet where several justices have concurrent jurisdiction,
one dishonest justice may be as much of an evil as though he
were the only justice. 'Whatever be the truth of these accusa-
tions, it is clear, from the very nature of their compensation,
that there must be many temptations in the way of justices.
According to the language of the courts, less than such an interest
will serve to disqualify a judge.1
7
The decision of the Supreme Court in the instant case may
be the beginning of an attack on the fee system of payment in
both criminal and civil cases. It will at least open the eyes of
many of some of the obvious defects in the system as it e:xists
today. It is to be hoped that it will do more than this, and that,
in those states where the system of payment is the same as that
in the instant case, it will stimulate sufficient interest to cause
all minor courts to be paid by salary. Until the justice system
is more nearly on an equality with the courts, as to payment
at least, general dissatisfaction with its functioning must
continue to prevail.
17"The interest which disqualifies a judge is a direct pecuniary or direct
property interest . . . where a liability or pecuniary gain must
occur on the event of the suit." Conkling v. Crosby, 239 Pac. 506, 512
(Ariz. 1925). "Any interest the probable and natural consequence of
which is to create a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party
to the suit is sufficient to disqualify." State v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 6G0, 662,
103 So. 835, 836 (1925) ; see Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52, 55, (180)).
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